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Abstract 
 Theoretical models have shown that full disclosure of private information will be induced when 
disclosures are credible and costless. Managers/sellers are predicted to disclose so as not to 
thought as holding the worst possible information. The objective of this paper is to test the basic 
model of full disclosure by using experimental methods. In this paper, I conducted 16 laboratory 
markets, manipulated two treatments and produced a 2×2 factorial cell design: (1) the number 
of possible states and (2) the existence of an antifraud rule. The former is due to question marks 
derived from the review of prior experimental researches. The latter is due to the concern for an 
antifraud rule posited as a critical condition in the model. The results support the theoretical 
and behavioral predictions generally, and provide some interesting findings. 
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1.  Introduction 
 In this paper I report some results of experimental markets designed to test the basic 
model of full disclosure1 based on the theoretical model that was introduced from the 
‘persuasion game’ of Milgrom (1981) and extended by Milgrom and Roberts (1986). Their 
researches shows that the senders of information will fully disclose their information so as 
not to be assumed to interpret non-disclosure as implying the worst possible news by the 
receivers of information when disclosures are both credible and costless. 
 The research of voluntary disclosures is of big importance because much issue has to do 
with the fundamental question of whether accounting regulation is necessary to enforce 
managerial disclosure or not (for example, King 1991a, 1991b, Choi and Muller 1992, Suda 
1992, Okabe 1994, Fujii 1998, and Oishi 2000). According to the results of theoretical 
analyses above, there is no need to force firms to disclose any information, because market 
mechanism alone would induce managers to disclose their private informations voluntarily. 
Obviously, disclosure or accounting regulations will be led from a lot of political, social, and 
of course economic factors and conditions, most of which are not included in the basic model 
of full disclosure. Therefore, for setting up some regulation it is not sufficient only to 
understand how market forces exercise some influence on voluntary disclosures, but that is 
                            
1 The term ‘the basic model of full isclosure’, of course, is my representation in this aper, and 
was not used in their papers. 
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essential to the setting process of accounting regulation2 (Chow 1996, footnote 3, p.134). 
 As one of the realms that experimental approach can be exercise its intrinsic ability, the 
basic model of full disclosure has been already tested experimentally in Forsythe et al. 
(1989), King and Wallin (1990, 1991a, 1991b) and Chow et al. (1996). In additional to these 
papers, King (1995) has conducted experimental tests for the modified versions of the basic 
model of full disclosure too, which were motivated by many empirical results of discrepancy 
between the theoretical prediction and the real world (that is, full disclosure did not have 
always occurred). Except for Chow et al. (1996), it has been reported that the experimental 
results supported the theoretical predictions generally.  
 Accepting these findings of prior researches solely, I might be called for conducting 
experiments to investigate one revised model that has not been conducted yet. However, 
reviewing the prior disclosure experiments in greater detail, it seems to me that they have 
some question marks here and there about their operations, designs, and interpretations of 
the results. One of major puzzles is that, for example, not to speak of Chow et al. (1996) 
concluded that full disclosure of private informations had not been arisen, there are some 
which are difficult to admit myself the occurrences of full disclosures among papers 
obtaining positive conclusions. Added to those question marks, it must be pointed out, the 
prior researches that had been intended to conduct the straight experimental tests of the 
                            
2 For copious discussions about accounting regulations, see Fujii (1998) and Oishi (2000). 
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basic model of full disclosure are few for the number of both designs and markets, which is 
the main focus of the tests of the modified versions. 
 On those accounts, I find it remained meaningful to test the basic model experimentally at 
this moment. 
 In this paper, 16 multiperiod experimental markets are conducted. In each market there 
were a single seller and three buyers. In each period, each seller was endowed with one 
commodity to offer for sale to the buyers. The distribution of commodity’s value is assumed 
to be common knowledge. At the beginning of each trading period, the seller was informed 
of the realization of commodity ’s value, and decided its message whether to reveal it 
truthfully to the buyers or not. Receiving the seller’s message, the buyers bade to purchase 
the commodity. The trading mechanism used was a first-price, sealed-bid auction 
institution. A 2×2 factorial design was created by manipulating (1) the number of possible 
commodity’s values nature selects and (2) the existence of an antifraud rule 3 .The 
manipulation (1) is relied mainly on the review of prior researches. There is no solid 
theoretical prediction in the cell without an antifraud rule (by the manipulation (2)), but 
                            
3 According to King (1990), “an antifraud rule is a mechanism that requires that the disclosure set must 
include as one of its elements the true (known) quality level. The rule permits vagueness but not lying 
(Ibid., p.860).” Non-disclosure is permitted because of not lying under this rule. While it might to be 
thought as a very strict assumption when applying to the real world, this setting may take on some 
realistic tinct if I assume both the existence of huge penalty and the positive probability that the fact of 
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the rule is an essential condition for the basic model of full disclosure. So, the cell without 
an antifraud rule was set up in order to examine the influence of excluding it on the results. 
 The results from this experiment, in general, supported the theoretical prediction of full 
disclosure, while sellers (i.e., manages in accounting context) were not indifferent between 
disclosures of the worst informations and non-disclosures of those, they usually disclosed 
their informations completely. The number of possible states (i.e., liquidating dividends) 
had little influence on the results. This is inconsistent with the results of prior papers. In 
the cells without an antifraud rule, overdisclosures occurred in general, but buyers (i.e., 
investors) saw through them and discounted fairly the commodity’s (liquidating dividend’s) 
values disclosed by sellers (managers). 
 The paper proceeds as follows. The next section 2 explains the basic model of full 
disclosure briefly, and describes how the model has been applied and modified in 
accounting context. In section 3, I indicate the reason why direct tests of the model has 
been conducted using experimental approach, review some prior researches, points out 
problems and question marks for the prior researches, and demonstrates the features of 
this paper. The experimental procedures and cell design are presented in the 4th section. 
Section 5 develops the hypotheses and some behavioral prediction and reports the 
experimental results. Summary and concluding remarks are given in section 6. 
                                                        
lying comes to light. 
 ５
 
2. Theory – The basic model of full disclosure and its application and extension 
2-1. The basic model of full disclosure 
 The basic model of full disclosure (hereafter, ‘the basic model’) is based on a theoretical 
model that was introduced from the ‘persuasion game’ of Milgrom (1981) and extended by 
Milgrom and Roberts (1986). In this section, I borrow heavily from their papers and explain 
‘the basic model’ briefly4. 
  The persuasion game can be represented as a game of an extension form as follows. 
Players consist of one seller and buyers and the transaction of a commodity is put into 
practice. First, Nature determines a certain point ix  from a finite set X . This represents 
the seller’s private information at once5. Here, ni ,...,2,1=  and nxxx <<<< ...0 21 . ix  
is a number which is directly connected with the value of the traded commodity. Buyers 
know the probability that any ix  is selected, ( ) 0>ixP .  The seller observes ix  and sends 
some message M  to the buyers. This message M  is required to be truthful ( ixM = ). 
That is, as far as the seller sends a message, he/she can’t lie to the buyers. He/ She only can 
                            
4 Here, the chief object in view is the ease of understanding. For the strict mathematical formation, see 
Milgrom (1981) particularly. 
5 The fact that nature determines ix  has an important implication. While ix  is the numerical value 
that determines the final allocation of resource, it is given and the seller can’t influence its value. In short, 
it is assumed that what is called ‘moral hazard problem’ is out of question. 
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either send the true value of ix  ( ixM = ) or send no message ( Æ=M ). In King (1990), 
the mechanism that gives reliability to the message is referred to an antifraud rule. All the 
buyers receive same message. So the seller can’t take a selective action that he/she sends 
the message to only some of the buyers. Observing the message M  from the seller, buyers 
evaluate its commodities. At the last, the final allocation is decided according to some 
transaction mechanism. The time line6 above is as follows. 
 
 
 The payoff of a seller is equal to the amount received from a purchased buyer, and that of 
a purchased buyer is equal to the commodities’ value minus the amount he/she paid and 0 
for buyers who lost in bid. So utilities of both a seller and buyers are supposed to be 
increasing functions of their payoffs, they have tried to maximize their payoffs. 
 In this dynamic game of incomplete information, there are many Bayesian-Nash 
equilibria. Each of them are composed two stages, i) being selected one message by a seller, 
buyers forms their belief about why that message are sended, and they decide bidding 
strategies aimed to maximize their expected payoffs, ii) given such buyers’ strategies, a 
seller decides his/her message-sending strategy to maximize its expected utility (For more 
details, see the 4th chapter of Gibbons (1992)). 
                            
6 The term ‘time line’ is used in Berg et al. (1990). 
① Nature decides the 
commodities’ value ix . 
② Sell r selects 
the Message M . 
③Buyers evaluate the 
commodities’ value. 
④ The allocation of 
wealth is decided.
 ７
  Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this game has two extreme cases, classified into the 
proportion that a seller sends a message about its truthful value of the commodity. One 
extreme is a case where a seller sends no message when any ix ’s determined by nature, 
buyers take it at face value and their prior beliefs are never changed, and they value its 
commodity at the average of the distribution ( m ). This means that, ( ) nxp i 1=  and 
11 xxx ss =-+ , assumed a discrete uniform distribution7, given no message, buyers continue 
to think that ( ) nMxp i 1=Æ=  and evaluate its commodity’s value at ( ) 12
1 xn +=m . Milgrom 
and Roberts (1986) express these buyers as ‘unsophisticated’ or ‘naively credulous’. Other 
extreme is the equilibrium that Milgrom and Roberts (1986) express sophisticated or 
‘assume-the-worst’, and in that equilibrium, perhaps except when 1=i , a seller always 
announces its commodity’s value ix . When 1=i , for a seller, it is indifferent between 
sending a truthful message and no message. Being sended a message, the buyer value the 
commodity at ix , and he/she acts upon the belief that commodity’s value is the lowest 
possibility 1x  in the case of no message. 
 There are many Bayesian-Nash equilibria between these two extreme proportions 
messages are sended, of 0 % or 100%. All of these equilibria are that the seller only reveals 
                            
7 Theoretical literatures don’t specify one established distribution form. So in the analysis on and after 
and the following experiment, for the ease of understanding and handling, I use the discrete uniform 
distribution. 
 ８
a specific level of the commodity’s value. Corresponding to such seller’s behavior, buyers 
build up their beliefs and bid zero for the seller ’s behavior deviated those equilibria. 
However, all these equilibria have undesirable properties, because buyers’ beliefs are not 
rational and these information sets are off the equilibrium path. In particular, for example, 
when a seller reveals the truthful quality, it is not rational intuitively that buyers bid zero 
on the ground the behavior is out of their beliefs.  
 Excluded all implausible equilibria by using the solution concept of perfect Bayesian-Nash 
equilibrium8, all of the equilibrium are removed except for that of buyers assuming worst 9. 
                            
8 In Milgrom (1981) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986), the solution concept of sequential equilibrium is 
used. However, in Gibbons (1992, p.179), as stated (1) there’s no difference between the perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium and the sequential equilibrium in many economic applications, and (2) for the complexity of a 
definition and the way of application, almost anther use the former, so I denote ‘perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium’ here. 
9 By reference to Verrecchia (1983, p.185), being transformed and abbreviated, this is demonstrated 
following numerical expression. The payoff of a seller is equal to (1) ix  when he/she send a message, and 
(2) the buyers’ expectation given no message from him/her, i.e. ( )Æ=MxE i  in the case of no message. 
Under the condition of no message, rational buyers assume that ix  is equal to some cutoff of disclosure 
(for example, xˆ ) or fall below it. That is to say, they value the commodity at ( )xxxE ii ˆ£ . A rational seller 
who aims to maximize its payoff recognized this, (1) if ( )xxxEx iii ˆ£³ , he/she sends a message, and (2) 
given ( )xxxEx iii ˆ£< , he/she send no message. Therefore, for a seller the cutoff of disclosure is 
( )xxxEx iii ˆ£= . At equilibrium, the cutoffs of both a seller and buyers are got to be equal. So it is 
( )xxxEx iii ˆ£= . Based on the assumption here that the commodity follows a discrete uniform 
distribution, the last equation is 
ii xx 2
1=  and this means all of the messages except for the case of 
lowest commodity’s value are sended.  
 ９
The explanation is as follows. 
 If a seller selects to send no message, therefore Æ=M , at the first step, a rational buyer 
might recognize that the seller prefer selecting Æ=M  and being valued at the average of 
distribution m  such as the former extreme case to selecting 
ixM =  and being valued at 
ix . If nature selects the commodity’s value beyond the mean (i.e., prior expectation of the 
distribution), a seller could get more payoff when he/she reveals it to buyers. So, under the 
condition of no message, the buyer gives zero to the percentage that the commodity’s value 
is above the mean.  
 After this period, given these buyers’ beliefs and strategies, a seller decides its message-
sending strategy. At the second step, if a seller doesn’t send any messages and reveal the 
commodity’s value, it is recognized to below the mean by buyers and the commodity is 
valued at the average of zero and the mean of distribution m  ( ( )
22
0 mm =+ ) from the 
assumption of the discrete uniform distribution. Therefore, if the commodity ’s value is 
beyond 
2
m , a seller prefers to send a message. 
 These unraveling processes are continued same as above, and at last, the range of a 
commodity’s value a seller can select when he/she doesn’t send an informative message10 is 
vanished, and he/ she reveals all of the commodity ’s value perhaps except for only the 
                            
10 King et al. (1990) demonstrates that an informative message is that ( ) ( )xEMxE ~~ ¹ . Being send one 
message are not synonymous with being send no message, it demands to revise one’s prior expectation. 
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lowest value. Fig. A depicts this process, using numerical lines and numerical values. It is 
assumed here that the commodity’s value is distributed [ ]100,...,2,1,0 . 
 
 
 
 
 The average of distribution is 50 . Then, at the 1st step, if nature selects the commodity’s 
value more than 50, a seller will be able to get more payoff to reveal it and evaluate its 
face value (for example, 70 ). For the buyers, so, both not to being revealed the commodity’s 
value and that the commodity’s value is from zero up to 50  are the same thing. At the 2nd 
step, if the commodity’s value is more than 25 , a seller gets more payoff to reveal it. 
Accordingly, when the commodity’s value is not revealed, a rational buyer values it under 
25 . Hereafter, these downward unraveling process are repeated, finally at the perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium, a seller prefer to sending all of the message of commodity’s value 
except of zero, and buyers take this into consideration and recognize that the commodity’s 
value is the lowest possibility given no message11. 
                            
11 Showing here is the process of thinking to reach equilibrium, and it never means how many times needs 
to reach there or the space when a seller send no message have become 
2
1  trial by trials. The important 
thing is a process that, given no message, a rational buyer renewals his/her belief. 
1st 
2nd 
3rd 
Last 
100
50 
25 
0 
Fig. A: Unraveling process 
 １１
In short, though there are a lot of perfect Bayesian-Nash equilibria in this dynamic game 
of incomplete information, it reaches out perfect Bayesian-Nash equilibrium by excluding 
implausible equilibria that are off the equilibrium path. Consequently, except for the lowest 
value of the commodity, a seller discloses all of its values to buyers. 
 
2-2. Applications and extensions of the basic model to accounting 
 For the basic model of perfect (or full) disclosure discussed in the section 2-1, though 
Milgrom (1981) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986) suggest the applicabilities to various 
economic instance, they don’t deal with the accounting issues directly. However, it is clear 
that, this basic model has very important implications to accounting reports and 
regulations and is easily applicable. In that place, a ‘seller’ and ‘buyers’ are changed into a 
‘manager’ and ‘investors’ respectively, the setting has changed that a manager transacts 
the asset (equity) that are paid the liquidation dividend at the end of a term with investors. 
In the first place, nature reveals to a manager some signal, concerned with the real 
liquidation value of its risky asset 12. It is not necessary to change the basic model’s 
                            
12 More easily, it is possible to think it as just the information about liquidation value of the asset (equity). 
Personally speaking, however, I think this signal as ‘a critical information on one’s decision making’. It’s a 
main issue that the critical information is either disclosed or not by a manager and is recognized exactly or 
not by investors, but adding these, I think there is another stage that the investors make decision using 
the information. 
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assumption that only a manager is endowed with the signal and the distribution of the 
signal is common knowledge between the interested parties. Upon received the signal, the 
alternatives for a manager are disclosing its exact value or making no disclosure (under an 
antifraud rule). Receiving the disclosure or nondisclosure from a manager, investors value 
the firm in order to purchased the asset. It is the same as the former model that some 
transaction mechanism is used to decide the allocation13. The time line of the application of 
basic model to the accounting disclosure is as follows. 
 
 
 
 The result of analysis is just the same. If communication between the parties (① and ②, 
② and ③) has no cost and there is an antifraud rule in ②, at the equilibrium a manager 
makes full disclosure about its firm’s state (perhaps, except for the worst). This 
consequence that occurs voluntary disclosures of information is called, ‘disclosure principle’ 
                            
13 It is assumed that a manager has to transfer its asset to the winning investor. The asset is of no value 
to the manager. This setting is referred in King (1990), and it is assumed a non-owner/manager. Jensen 
and Murphy (1990) carries on investigate the relation between accounting profits and rewards of CEOs. 
They obtain an interesting result, which shows the management reward  increased by ¢17.7 as the 
accounting profit increased by $1,000. This finding may give some validity to the setting here that the 
payoff of a manager is influenced its firm’s situation decided by nature. Still more, though the model 
assumes a firm liquidates period by period, the result of analysis holds true for going concerns too.  
① Nature reveals the
firm’s condition (liquidated 
value) of this period. 
②A manager makes 
a disclosure of its 
firm’s state. 
③Investors value the 
firm. 
④ The allocation of 
wealth is determined. 
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in Dye (1985) or ‘market-induced information disclosure’ in King (1991). 
 These results of analysis have a great interest in arguing accounting regulation14. By 
working some market mechanism, any information could be disclosed voluntarily by a 
manager. Therefore, it implies that there’s no need to force firms to disclose publicly any 
information. Thinking out both the costs of accounting regulation15 and the propriety of 
forcing all of the firms to obey a same regulation16, this result casts a pall of gloom over the 
argument about accounting regulation on the assumption that more and more regulations 
must be needed. 
 The results in the basic model, however, have been revised and expanding by taking costly 
disclosure (Verrecchia 1983), costly obtainment of disclosure (Matthews and Postlewaite 
1985), uncertainty of seller’s disclosure endowment (Dye 1985, Jung and Kwon 1988), and 
                            
14 Definition of accounting regulation lies in Nakamura (1992) or Oishi (2000) for example. Here, I grasp it 
is ‘what forces to disclose the critical information for making decisions’ in a quite broad sense. It might be 
thought that the presence of an antifraud rule itself is an accounting regulation, but the problem is solved 
to some extent, adding that an antifraud rule provides to punishes a manager who makes a fictious 
disclosure with a very severe penalty, assuming that there is a positive probability of being detected 
his/her fraud disclosure, and a manager imposes himself/herself an antifraud rule. 
15 In Nakamura (1992, Ibid., p.30), they are ‘the costs related consumption of the resources resulting from 
the establishment of the accounting laws or principles, observance and lookout, and lawsuit. In the 
opposite direction, the government will impose taxes on the people. 
16 Fujii (1998) points out, standing a point of view that any regulations are unnecessary, because of the 
diversity of firms’ managerial environment, optimal disclosure levels can be different between firms. 
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the presence of proprietary information (Dye 1985, Wagenhofer 1990) and so on. All of them 
attempt to address some situation where a manager has an incentive to withhold disclosure 
in some range among the state nature selected on the assumption of an antifraud rule. For 
example, Jung and Kwon (1988) analyze the settings there is positive probability that a 
manager doesn’t know its firm’s state of one period. Then, investors can’t distinguish non-
disclosure from either the seller’s lack of information or the unfavorableness of his/her 
information same as the basic model. Under such situation, it might be the case that the 
information is threshold and is not disclosed voluntarily. 
 These expansions of the basic model focus on some discrepancy between the theoretical 
prediction for voluntary disclosures and the real world. First, there are lots of empirical 
evidences which prove voluntary disclosures don’t always occur. Some of them are including 
papers such as, the earnings prediction of a manager and its reaction of the capital market 
(Patel 1976, Waymire 1984, 1985, and Lev and Penman 1990), the practice of blind bidding 
behavior in the motion picture industry in the U.S.A., and gas-octane reporting (Jovanovic 
1982). For example, Lev and Penman (1990) argued that, managers tend to disclose good 
news rather than bad news and the firm not to disclose doesn’t experience the drastic fall 
in its stock price. And second, the evolutions of the basic model are originated from the 
accounting regulations in the real world. As pointed out, accounting regulation in many 
countries a r e  heading the way of tightening, and there is some empirical researches, 
 １５
stating that the public and the quasi-public accounting principle setting institutions pass a 
judgment that market force is not enough to enforce managers to make sufficient 
disclosures (A series of movement in the U.S.A. is detailed in Chow et al. (1996)).  
 However, is it possible to do direct tests of the model by the empirical researches using 
datas from naturally occurring markets17?  In the next section, I’ll give a negative view on 
this question and explain why experimental approach has used. 
 
3. Experimental approach 
3-1. The limitation of empirical research18―why the experiment is fit? 
 As noted in the former section, the tests of the model using data from naturally occurring 
markets are problematic. Chow et al. (1998, Ibid. p.135) remarks that, touching this point 
at issue, “in addiction to problems of potential model misspecifications and omitted 
variables, a key difficulty is measurement error in variables, which is an especially 
significant obstacle because of the researcher’s lack of access to the complete information 
set of managers.” Showing along time line of the model, that is, it is impossible for 
empirical researches using data from naturally occurring markets to recognize the critical 
                            
17 They are also called ‘archival data’. To compare the data generating in the laboratory, this term is used. 
18 It’s true that the experimental approach is one of the methods of empirical research. So, the title of this 
section may be needed to add an objective verb ‘previous’. 
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matters for analysis, for example ① what states that nature selects can be arisen (prior 
distribution) or ② what means (actions) a manager can select. Since it is necessary to 
provide some assumptions and comparisons, it demands some interpretations for the 
findings of these empirical researches and it makes unclear the result itself (For similar 
views, see the section 6 of Waymire (1985)). 
 Contrary to above problems, in the experiment, both the states of its firm which are 
selected by nature at ① and the means which a manager can select at ②  can be 
determined as a rules in a laboratory, and we can have control over them perfectly. 
Therefore, we can do the direct test of models. 
 Both methods of empirical researches using datas from naturally occurring markets and 
experimental datas are not alternative or exclusive each other. It is true that, taking the 
former researches opportunities, theoretical models have been revised, and the new 
experiments have been stimulated to conduct (For more details, see the chapter 1 of Kagel 
and Roth (1995)). However, for the tests of the basic model and the models 
revised/expanded it, it is not appropriate using the data from naturally occurring markets, 
experimental approaches become powerful means. 
 
3-2. Prior experimental researches 
 There are some prior experimental researches. Some of them had already incorporated the 
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extension of the basic model as above, and the issues to confirm by experiments have 
developed from “Can the private disclosure suggested by the basic model occur in 
laboratory actually?” into “Under what conditions does a manager have an incentive to 
threshold his/her information disclosure?” 
 Forsythe et al. (1989) is one early experimental literature addressing this issue. Taking 
into account the institution of blind bidding in the motion picture industry of the U.S.A., 
and the actual cases such that entering protects from exhibitors (i.e., owners and operators 
of movie theaters) and laws prohibiting its practice by some states, they conducted tests of 
the basic model. Numbers of the possible states which nature selects were 125 in one cell 
( [ ]125,...,2,1 ) and 8 in another cell ( [ ] [ ]( )15,...,2,1,...,, +ⅧⅡⅠType )19. In Forsythe et al. (1989), 
their experimental markets consisted of four sellers and four buyers, differing widely in 
that there were a single seller and three (or four) buyers in other prior experiments. They 
explain “the purpose of having multiple sellers was simply so that buyers could have more 
rapidly gain experience with the trading rules (Ibid., p.221).” This factor does not affect the 
predictions of the theory in a significant way as they describe, but it was not the direct 
tests of the model. Each four buyer made decisions to purchase four items from four 
                            
19 In this latter cell, the value of an asset was determined by both its common value [ ]ⅧⅡⅠ ,...,,Type  (type 
number were multiplied by fifteen) and the private value [ ]( )15,...,2,1 . The common value was same among 
all subjects acting as buyers in the markets, but the private value was different for each subject. And its 
total represented the asset value for one buyer. 
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distinct sellers each period, and taking both this setting and competitions with other rivals 
into consideration, each four seller decided its disclosure. Forsythe et al. (1989) conclude 
that “it is clear that the sequential equilibrium model is a good predictor of behavior in 
these simple markets (Ibid., p.230)”, revealing a support of full disclosure model. 
 R. R. King and D. E. Wallin are researchers who have conducted the most extensive 
experimental researches in this realm. In King and Wallin (1990), the thesis was effect of 
antifraud rules and ex post verifiability on theoretical predictions of the model, and some 
experiments were conducted in a 2×2 cell setting. An asset of an object for transaction was, 
differing critically from other experiments, a $1 lottery ticket. The ticket could have one of 
three realization levels that nature selected (10, 50, and 90 percent), specifying the 
probability that it would pay $1 or zero. For example, in the cell with an antifraud rule, 
when a seller revealed that the realization level was 90 percent, each buyer valued the 
lottery ticket which was pay out $1 by the probability of 90 percent20. Same transactions 
were repeated fifty times, and for each period one unit was traded. The exchange 
institution used was a first-price sealed bid auction. Their results supported the prediction 
of the basic model strongly, in the cells with an antifraud rule, and the equilibrium of full 
disclosure occurred generally regardless of export verifiability.  
 King and Wallin (1991b) investigated the prediction of the basic model and the effect of 
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the number of disclosure options available to a seller. It was assumed that there was an 
asset which was paid a liquidating dividend chosen from one uniform discrete distribution 
[ ]85,...,25,15 , while a seller was restrained by an antifraud rule, he/she had some disclosure 
options. The last setting was that, for example, when nature had selected 55 from above 
distribution, a seller was able to make four forms of disclosure options such as; (1) a point 
disclosure of { }55 , (2) a consecutive pair of { }55,45  or { }65,55 , (3) the latter half of possible 
dividend values of { }85,75,65,55 , and (4) non-disclosure which would be 
{ }85,75,65,55,45,35,25,15 . Their intention was to investigate the effect of the disclosure 
options on the arrival at equilibrium, because given the theoretical prediction that the 
rational buyer put a lower and lower estimation on the value of an asset when no disclosure 
is made, the number of disclosure options may weaken the buyer’s ability to reach some 
equilibrium. Also, a double auction (DA) was adopted as the trading institution because of 
its favorableness to converge to competitive equilibrium, and eight assets were endowed 
with a seller and were traded each period. These settings are characteristic of this paper. 
The result is that, the seller moved toward full disclosure (in their paper, referred to 
‘market-induced information disclosure: MID), though the theoretical predictions were 
weakened as the number of disclosure options increased, ceteris paribus. 
 In King and Wallin (1991a), the asset value of one particular period was drawn out of the 
                                                        
20 They also have introduced two different distributions of realization levels, but it is not interest here. 
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uniform discrete distribution identical with King and Wallin (1991b). It was characteristic 
of this paper to report experimental results in the case that there was positive prior 
probability both a seller and buyers were given no information about the asset value of that 
period, based on the model in Dye (1985) and Jung and Kwon (1988). The prior probability 
a manager was endowed with no information was 0 , 1.0 , or 3.0 . Then, it was not 
different from the basic model in the case of 0 , but, for example if it was set at 3.0  in one 
setting, a manager was not informed of its period’s asset value at the probability of thirty 
percent of all trading periods (= 50 in their setting), so a manager didn’t know the asset 
value either. Though coincidence with a point prediction from the theoretical calculations 
were not found out, they concluded that their results were consistent with the general 
proposition of the model stating that the range of no disclosure had came to large as the 
prior probability increased.  
 King and Wallin (1995) presented the results of experimental test based on Wagenhofer’s 
(1990) model. In Wagenhofer (1990), it was assumed that there was an opponent who 
entered the market and reduced the terminal value of the asset by certain fixed amount 
only if the opponent believed the firm’s expected value was more than one exogenously 
specified threshold. In this case, a buyer can’t know the reason why a seller makes no 
disclosure either due to unfavorableness of his information about the firm’s value (similar 
to the basic model) or due to the avoidance of loss from entering an opponent. Wagenhofer 
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(1990) proved the existence of three sequential equilibria, then King and Wallin (1995) 
investigate which equilibrium would have reached in the laboratory. The uniform 
distribution of the asset’s value here was [ ]400,...1,0 . Mixed with above complex settings, 
although they concluded that the experimental results supported the theoretical prediction 
of Wagenhofer’s (1990) disclosure model, but the results were somewhat unclear to 
interpret 21. 
 Chow et al. (1996) is the only article argued “this findings fails to support the 
(equilibrium) prediction of analytical research that when disclosure is costless, managers 
voluntarily disclose all news (Ibid., p.149).” In this experiment, the number of possible 
values of asset was 201 which was drawn from the uniform discrete distribution such as 
[ ]200,...,1,0 , and added to the basic model, they investigated the Verrecchia’s (1983) 
disclosure model which proved that､ full disclosures might not have occurred in the certain 
situation when disclosure was costly. Even in the cells with no cost of disclosure, however, 
among four test periods out of all 13 periods (from period 9 to 12) of 39 markets conducted, 
no disclosures were occurred by the proportion of 41.7 percent, failing to support the 
theoretical predictions. Chow et al. (1996) point out as the main reasons, sparing the 
                            
21 To add to this, King (1996) researches the effect of allowing a seller discretionary disclosures on the 
parties’ actions. However, I don’t refer to it here because buyers’ payoffs were influenced directly by a 
seller’s action in his setting. 
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number of pages about why such results were achieved, there existed some buyers who 
didn’t price-protected themselves (that is, didn’t assume the worst), continued to bid the 
higher prices, hold the seller ’s payoff at higher levels, and didn’t give sellers incentives to 
disclose22. 
 In summary, except for Chow et al. (1996), the prior researches have obtained the 
affirmative conclusions about the theoretical predictions of both the basic model and its 
modified models. 
 
3-3. Problems and question marks for the prior researches 
 Accepting these findings of prior researches solely, it might be necessary to conduct 
experiments to investigate one revised model that has not been conducted yet. However, 
reviewing the prior disclosure experiments minutely, it is true to find some question marks 
here and there about their operations, designs, and interpretations of results. In this 
section, I will point out some problems in the prior researches and explain this paper’s 
standpoint positing an emphasis on the experiments of the basic model. 
 One major puzzle is that, not to speak of Chow et al. (1996) concluded full disclosures of 
                            
22 It has not been given a clear explanation about why right then such buyers existed. However, they 
suggested that the realized pay for subjects acting as buyers was admittedly low. I will touch this problem 
of reward in the experiment later. 
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private informations had not been arisen, there are some papers which are difficult to 
interpret as the occurrences of full disclosures among papers obtaining positive conclusions. 
For instance, in King and Wallin (1991b), no disclosure occurred in the proportion of 40 
percent (in cell A: a manager was endowed with the firm’s value and it was common 
knowledge among all subjects, that is similar to the basic model) even in the latter half of 
their fifty trading periods. Also, in King and Wallin (1991a), no disclosure occurred in the 
proportion of 8 to 34 (=23.5 percent) in the situation which was predicted theoretically the 
occurrence of full disclosures. In Forsythe et al. (1990), these problem is somewhat 
moderated, but no disclosure occurred in the ratio of about one to five.  
 Having reviewed the prior researches in detail above, one can notice that King and Wallin 
(1990) is the only paper that is able to accept the occurrences of full disclosures without 
reservation. In King and Wallin (1990), disclosures occurred in the proportion of both 95.5 
percent (=128/134, in the setting of cell A, which had an antifraud rule and all the buyers 
were informed of what had happened in its period trial by trial) and 89.6 percent (120/134, 
in the cell B, which also had an antifraud rule but the buyers were not informed of the 
consequence of one period). As pointed out in the section 3-2, however, in this experiment, it 
was a lottery ticket, which took only one of three probabilities to come up. So, it turns out 
that the equilibrium was able to be reached without reservation when the number of 
possible states selected by nature was three, but the experimental results became 
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somewhat ambiguous as the number increased to 8, and it put obvious obstacles to reach 
the analytical equilibrium as the possibilities numbered in 125 or 201. This matter is of 
importance, I think. That is to say, it can be interpreted that, only in the case where it is a 
common knowledge that the firm’s value (or the liquidating dividend of one period) could 
take one form from only three forms, for example, that is ‘high’, ‘neutral’ and ‘low’, a 
manager discloses its value except for ‘low’ and investors can find it to be ‘low’ when no 
disclosure is made. Consequently, the applicability of the results to real world that the 
distribution of firm’s value must be continuous and not a common knowledge may be 
constrained severely. Also, though employing last one or a few from dozens of trials for its 
test period and arriving at some decision, it means that it needs to take considerable trials 
to reach an equilibrium. 
 Relatively low monetary rewards to subjects may be one of the problems. For example, in 
Chow et al. (1996), the average monetary reward for their three hours experimental session 
was $13.84 (s=$0.85) to subjects participated as sellers and $7.76 (s=$10.53) to ones 
participated as buyers, it might have not been enough to motivate subject students23. 
                            
23 There always exists criticisms for the experimental method itself that whether certain theory is 
supported or not depends on the level of monetary rewards. I don’t deliberate this here, but generally 
speaking, it doesn’t give a great influence upon experimental results insofar an experimenter pays its 
experimental reward s according to induced-value theory of Smith (1976). However, it seems that when 
student subjects are involved in the experiment, it is necessary for an experimenter to design his/her 
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 In addition to the monetary motivation for subject’s level of interest and involvement, 
there is an intrinsic problem in the method of determining subject’s reward of disclosure 
experiment, which indicated in Berg et al. (1990) as “a trading institution that gives all 
gains to trade to one side of the market (Ibid., p831)”24. In other words, it is a zero profit 
condition whose expected trading profits are zero for subjects acting as buyers (investors). 
In some equilibrium predicted theoretically, a seller (manager) makes full disclosures of 
his/her private informations. Being no disclosures, investors (buyers) can detect that the 
manager (seller) has the worst possible information. Then investors (buyers) are confronted 
with making decisions on which how they valued the asset whose terminal value 
(liquidating dividend) is known, and competitions among investors (buyers) drive buyers’ 
expected profit to zero. That is, a winning investor (buyer) expects to value at 100 and 
receive 100 when a manager (seller) disclosed the firm’s state is 100, for example, As the 
amount received become equal to the amount paid, investors’ (buyers’) trading profits 
expect to equal to zero in the equilibrium25. How do the subjects acting as buyers think that 
the consequences of their rational decisions are not quite connected with their monetary 
                                                        
experimental settings taking their due reward levels for the part-time jobs into consideration. 
24 King and Wallin (1991, p.176) point out the similar problem. 
25 As denoted above, my awareness of problem is whether one critical information for decision making is 
disclosed or not, and I assume to be a next stage in which investors (buyers) make decisions themselves 
taking the manager’s (seller’s) behavior into consideration. They are assumed to gain in this next stage, so 
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rewards? 
 The number of trials in one experimental session, too, may be problematic. In prior 
researches, there is major difference between King and Wallin (1990) which was used the 
computer system (AEMLS: the Arizona Experimental Markets Laboratory System) in 
experimentation and was able to report 50 times, and Forsythe et al. (1989) and Chow et al. 
(1996) which manually conducted their experiments and could duplicate only 20 and 13 
times, respectively. Chow et al. (1996, p.149) reveals that, by referring this issue 
particularly, their primary obstacles to the number of trading periods was the tight time 
demand of manually conducting their experiment. In contrast, many trading periods such 
as 50 trials and more may arise another problem of slowness to reach the equilibrium. 
Because of easier learning and favorableness to reach the equilibrium, in some prior 
researches, the experimental designs such as the double auction (DA) institution with 
multiple assets (King, 1991b) and the competitions among four sellers has been introduced 
to test the basic model. Though the theory itself does not stipulate one particular trading 
mechanism, the DA institution is not appropriate for the test of basic model because it 
would have admit some additional information flow from a manager (seller) to investors 
(buyers) by way of the offer made and the bids accepted26. Introduction of competitions 
                                                        
it is not a wonder their inferences given no or full disclosure don’t make profits. 
26 This is just what themselves point out in King and Wallin (1990, p.870). 
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among plural managers (sellers) imports a new factor into the basic model, although 
Forsythe et al. (1989, p.221) expresses the factor does not affect the predictions of theory in 
a significant way. The buyers have bid to purchase plural assets from the distinct sellers at 
the same time. 
 Finally, I want to point out too, it should also be stressed that the prior researches that 
had been intended to conduct the straight experimental tests of the basic model are few for 
the number of both designs and markets. 
In summary, I find it remained meaningful to test again the basic model experimentally. 
On the other hand, it is the case that there is ample scope leaving its design to the 
experimenter’s discretion even if one experiment is directed toward the test of the basic 
model. For that reason, in this paper, according to the findings of prior researches and my 
question marks above, it should be very significant to conduct experiments to test the 
prediction of the basic model using as refined design as possible. 
 
4. Experimental methods 
4-1. Market environment 
 The terms such as, ‘a manager’, ‘investors’, and ‘the firm’s state (liquidating dividend)’, 
and ‘disclosures’, may give subjects some psychological biases. So, I use more general terms 
such as, ‘a seller’, ‘buyers’, ‘the commodity’s value’, and ‘sending messages’ as a substitute 
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for such words as ‘a manager’, ‘investors’, and ‘the firm’s state (liquidating dividend)’, and 
‘disclosures’, respectively 27 . Therefore, although I have more passionate concern for 
accounting settings, the general terms are in principle used in this and next sections while 
in part both are used compatibly.  
 In each market, there were a single seller and three buyers. This group consisted of four 
subjects has been maintained throughout the periods of one experimental session28. The 
tasks of subjects in this experiment were transactions of fictious commodities29. In each 
                            
27 In consequence, the experiments have been conducted in consonance with the models of Milgrom (1980) 
and others. This transformation into more general words may be interpreted to be an obstacle in case of 
the application of experimental results to the real world. However, the more realistic the objects that we 
want to test in the experiments are, the further the experiments part from the empirical inspections of 
theories without removing the factors which the subjects may act based on outside of their monetary 
incentives. For example, it is physically impossible to believe that, informing the subjects that the 
experiment researches about bribery, tax evasion, or swindle, gives no psychological bias. 
28 It can be thought the experimental design, which changes the matching of seller with buyers in each 
period of one session, or what more, which changes to assign even the subject’s role in one experiment 
randomly. But it was not employed because the adoption of such setting would have got the control of 
experiment very intricate. So, the influences of these designs to the results are remained unknown. If it is 
true for the theoretical prediction that the reasonable buyer revises his/her beliefs graduatelly and reach 
the equilibrium over time, the results might be deteriorated when such settings were adopted. 
29 Informally, I received an indication from a practioner that some prior image against the 
tangible/intangible goods/service is essential to a transaction of commodity (that is, the commodity of this 
‘widget’ is like this). Though I intended to get over this by the setting of distribution of possible values of 
the commodity, the indication was thought to be convincing. The complement ‘fictious’, therefore, was 
interpolated in the instruction. 
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period, each seller had only one commodity to offer for sale to the buyers. At the beginning 
of each trading period, each seller was informed of the realization of the commodity’s value 
for sale in that period, and buyers were conscious that the seller had that knowledge. In 
each period and for each commodity, this value was drawn with replacement from the 
discrete uniform distribution described after, where all integers in that interval were 
equally likely. Both the seller and the buyers knew the distribution of the commodity 
values. Also, the seller and the buyers were told that the commodity was sold in each period 
without reserve. If no transaction occurred, any unsold commodities were worthless to the 
seller, but all the market participants were not informed of this30. 
 The trading mechanism was a first-price sealed-bid auction institution. As the theory 
itself does not stipulate a specific institution, other trading mechanism can be selected. But 
I selected this institution because the double auction (DA) institution was somewhat 
problematic as argued in the section3-3 and other institution such as the second-price 
sealed-bid auction institution was thought to be difficult to understand for subjects, while 
the second-price sealed-bid auction institution had an advantage to reveal buyers’ 
evaluation of the commodity completely 31. And one reason why the first-price, sealed-bid 
                            
30 As denoted in the next section 5, some subjects took advantage of the characteristic in this experimental 
design.  
31 Under the second-price sealed-bid auction institution, the dominant strategy for each buyer is to bid 
his/her true reservation price. 
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auction was implemented is to relax a zero profit condition, which was mentioned above. 
 In a main issue of this experiment is to investigate whether the theoretical prediction of 
full disclosures of private informations takes place in the laboratory, and if not, where the 
causes on the equilibrium path are. Based on such a concern, it is problematic to set a new 
stage that reveals the buyers’ evaluation of the commodity using this trading mechanism, 
the first-price, sealed-bid auction (the model doesn’t consider this stage). The prediction of 
the theory may be influenced by this new stage. However, in the theoretical model it is 
assumed that there is an antifraud rule, so the value of commodity reveals itself when not 
only a message is sended, but also in equilibrium no message is sended. Competition 
among the buyers drives their evaluations to be nearly equal to the price. Therefore, using 
the first-price, sealed-bid auction institution in the experiment does not generate 
inconsistency with the theory (for detailed arguments of using the sealed-bid auction in 
more complex settings, see the section 2 of Forsythe et al. (1989, p.219)). 
 
4-2 Experimental designs 
 Two manipulations32 were conducted. One of them was the distribution of commodity’s 
value from which nature selected. The commodity’s value was randomly drawn from the 
                            
32 It is also called ‘treatment’. 
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discrete uniform distribution either of [ ]175,150,125,100,75,50,25  or of [ ]175,...,26,25 33. These 
two were equal in ranges and means of one hundred, but differ widely in that the numbers 
of possible commodity’s value were 7 in one cell and 151 in the other. These reflect the 
argument in the section 3-3, in which the number of possible states nature select may 
influence on the experimental results, and will discuss particularly in the next section of 
the Hypotheses. 
 Another manipulation was related to the existence and inexistence of an antifraud rule. 
The existence of an antifraud rule is a critical factor for the basic model and its 
modification. So, given no antifraud rule, the theory losses its predictable power. While 
some forecasts are possible and I will dispute over that issue, experiments of the cell 
without an antifraud rule were conducted not to test the solid theoretical prediction but to 
obtain some findings about influences of no antifraud rule. 
 According to these two manipulations, cells design of this experiment is represented as 
follows. 
Cells design of the experiment
The number of possible states
7 151
An antifraudExistCell ①cell ②
ruleNot existCell ③cell ④ 
 
                            
33 These number settings were arbitrary. 
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4-3. Conduct of experiments 
 Experimental markets were run at the Toyonaka campus, Osaka University on the 26th 
and next 27th of November in 1998. Subjects were students of Osaka University recruited 
from graduate and undergraduate courses, and they were manifold in their academic 
background34. All four cells had four independent markets, and each market had one seller 
of a commodity and three buyers, figuring up 64 subjects.  
 Each market consisted of a number of repetitions of same events. Upon arrival at a 
classroom, subjects drew lots35 at the entrance and were ushered their numbers’ seats 
guided by assistants. A written instruction and experimental materials 36  within an 
envelope were prepared for in advance on each seat, and the subjects were cautioned not to 
open and look at them before indicated. There placed kitchen guards37 on their desks to 
prevent one subject from seeing others’ informations and decisions. After all the subjects 
                            
34 For example, they were majoring economics, law, literature, science, medicine, and so on. In the prior 
papers, Forsythe et al. (1989) denoted to use undergraduate students at three different location (Carnegie-
Mellon University, the University of Arizona, and the University of Iowa), and in Chow et al. (1996) there 
were 156 students recruited from upper level and graduate finance course, and in King and Wallin (1991a, 
1995) and King (1996), Washington University business students were involved as subjects. Upon 
recruiting subjects, I did not ask any academic backgrounds, grades, and knowledge. 
35 The lots were used to assign randomly the subjects to their tasks in a particular markets. 
36 The instruction and the main experimental materials are available upon request from the author. 
37 The kitchen guard is an oil-guarding steel board using generally in the kitchen. Three directions are 
intercepted from other subjects by about thirty centimeters in height. 
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took their seats, the experimental sessions were started. At first, I took considerable time 
for the instruction to inform the subjects about their tasks and the rules governing trade 
and how their cash reward would be determined. Written instruction was given each and 
playbacked by a cassette recorder with a radio. At the end of the instruction, two examples 
were given to confirm the actual transaction flow and payoffs. A transaction in each period 
was as follows (the parenthetic numbers (1)-(4) correspond to the time line of the basic 
model in the section 2-1). 
(1) The value of its period’s commodity was determined by nature from the distribution 
described above 38 , and was informed only to the subject acting as a seller. The 
preselected value sequences differed for each market in the same session, but they were 
same in the cell ① and the cell ③, and in the cell ② and the cell ④39. 
(2) The seller decided whether to reveal this information to buyers (i.e., message). In this 
case, it meant that all three subjects acting as buyers received the same message from a 
seller (so, some different treatment across the buyers was not allowed). In the cell ① 
                            
38 The sequence of commodity’s values over all twenty periods had been preselected using random number 
generating tool of the software. See DeJong et al. (1985) for a discussion of this presequencing. 
39 Given the same distribution is used, it has been found that the actual value flows drowned from its 
distribution had some influence on the experimental results (for example, King 1996). So I changed the 
sequences market by market although the subjects were not able to know anything about the other market 
in which they were not participated. The reason why the cells with and without an antifraud rule had the 
same sequence was to facilitate the comparison of the results. 
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and the cell ②, the disclosure options available to the seller was either ‘disclosing the 
informed value truthfully’ or ‘making no disclosure’, but in the cell ③ and the cell ④ 
without antifraud rules, the former option was changed to ‘selecting one possible value 
and disclosing it’ and the antifraud rule was excluded according to the cell designs in 
this way.  
(3) Receiving the seller ’s message, the buyers valued the commodity to purchase in that 
period and tendered written bids.  
(4) The highest bid among the three wined in the auction, and the winning buyer paid the 
amount equal to his/her bid. If plural buyers tied for the highest bid, then a dice 
determined who purchased its commodity.  
It is the payoff of that period for a winning buyer to be the trading profit (or loss) that 
equaled to the commodity’s value minus the amount paid was. The payoff of a seller was 
equal to the bid amount received from the buyer and those of the losing buyers were 
zero in that period. 
All three bid prices, the winning bid, the commodity’s value, and the identification of 
the winning buyer in that period were told to all the participants in the market at the 
end of each period40. 
                            
40 There are some design choices such as, the only winning buyer and (of course) the seller can know the 
highest bid, or not all three bid prices but only the highest bid is revealed publicly. The design used in this 
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 All necessary informations, for example that period’s commodity value and bids submitted 
etc., were informed and transmitted using B8 cards by assistants. 
 The transaction of commodity was repeated 20 times, which was prescribed and informed 
to all subjects in the instruction41. The total payoff for twenty periods (= rewards) was fixed 
according to the following expressions (in: ¥). 
The seller: th sum of the amount received from buyers  
+ the number of period c nducted (=20) × 40 
The buyers: the sum of his/her trading profit × 2 + 1,000  
+ the number of period c nducted (=20) × 80 
 In consonance to the theory, I asked the subjects for acting to maximize the first term, but 
the other terms were added in. 1,000 was the initial endowment (referred to the ‘budget’ in 
the experiment due to the facility of comprehension), and it was given to the buyer because 
he/she was not endowed with a commodity in each period and there was positive 
probability to suffer the loss in the transaction. The payoffs that were related to the 
number of periods conducted were added in because of a zero profit condition for the buyers 
                                                        
experiment might have functioned to fasten the subjects’ learning. 
41 Letting the subjects know the terminal trading period may have an effect on the outcome of the game. 
Chow et al. (1996, p.140), for example, consider the potential biases of end-of-game strategic behavior. 
However, actually such an effect has been found. I, therefore, do not touch this problem hereafter. 
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as mentioned above42. The same reasoning applies to the treatment that the sum of the 
buyer’s trading profit was doubled43. 
 After the actual trading session ended, the subjects completed an evaluation forms and 
then questionnaires, were paid and left. Throughout the instruction and actual experiment, 
all participants were monitored to prevent communication with each other. Each 
experimental market lasted about two hours and twenty minutes. Average cash pay was 
¥2,721.86, the maximum was ¥3,384 and the minimum was ¥2,24944. 
5. Hypotheses and experimental results 
5-1. Hypotheses and behavioral forecasts 
 Hypotheses of the cells with an antifraud rule (i.e., the cell ① and ②) 
 The first hypothesis is directly linked with the main theme of this paper. As being posited 
an antifraud rule, a seller must inform the realization of its commodity’s value as far as 
                            
42 Although the intention was quite different, Forsythe et al. (1989) gave the similar payoffs to only the 
buyers as commission values. 
43 According to these expressions, the prior expected payoffs for the subjects were, ¥2,800 for the seller 
and ¥2,600 for the buyer, respectively. A slight higher expected payoff for the seller was due to the result of 
a non-cash payment pretest, which had been conducted using undergraduate students majoring 
accounting on the 9 th of November. Being priced very low by the subjects acting as buyers, the seller had 
been taken away much of its payoff. Also, for the seller, the expected pay is equal to the maximum too.  
44 Because of its design, there were not large differences among the subjects. To give incentives to involve 
hardly for them, it might be desirable to come out perceptive differences due to their decision-makings. In 
this respect, I might have to say that this is one of the intrinsic problems of these disclosure experiments. 
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he/she send a message. Then, the theory in the section 2-1 predicts the disclosure pattern 
in equilibrium as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 1: In the cells with an antifraud rule, a seller reveals all the commodity’s value. 
So, ixM = . When the commodity’s value is the lowest, namely 25 in the 
setting here, the seller is indifferent between disclosing it and withholding 
it. 
 
 As the somewhat plausible alternative hypotheses, this paper attempts to research the 
convergences to other representative Bayesian Nash equilibria such as, the naive expected 
value model in King and Wallin (1991b), the goods news hypothesis in King and Wallin 
(1991a), and the naive model in Miller and Plott (1985)., and so on. Concretely speaking, 
there are: (1) no disclosure always occurs, (2) the values more than the mean of the 
distribution (i.e., here 100) are only revealed by sellers, (3) disclosures of some specific 
values (or value) and (4) random disclosures occur.  
 In order to examine whether the perfect Bayesian equilibrium could be reached or not, 
including the relevant actions on the side of subjects acting buyers, some conditions are 
necessary to set. Unlike Forsythe et al. (1989), these conditions are not set as formal 
hypotheses. However, I will investigate properly whether the subjects acted as suggested to 
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the theoretical prediction or not, as argued in Forsythe et al. (1989) and Chow et al. (1996).  
The second hypothesis is built on the indication of the section 3-3, implying the question 
marks from the reviews of prior researches. There was one of the question marks as to ‘the 
relationship between the number of possible states and the experimental result’. It 
mentioned that, the results had been weakened as the numbers were increased to 8, 125, 
and 201, respectively, although full disclosure occurred undoubtedly when the number of 
possible states is three. The unraveling process predicts that the buyer narrows the set of 
commodity’s value graduatelly given no disclosure. Therefore, it could be understood that it 
does not imply that the number of possible states influences the experimental results, but 
this dysfunction in the case of 8 suggests that the experimental results are less applicable 
to the real world. In this paper, I examine this issue to judge the possibility for future 
developments of these experiments by changing the number of possible commodity’s values 
into 7 (= cell ①) and 151 (cell ②).  
 According to the theory, the number of possible states does not have any influences. 
 
Hypothesis 2: About sellers’ disclosure patterns, there is no difference between the cell ① 
and the cell ②. 
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 Behavioral forecasts of the cells without an antifraud rule (i.e., the cell ③and ④) 
 As stated in the section 4-2 of experimental design, the creation of cells without an 
antifraud rule is not based on any theoretical prediction. And, the argument of the basic 
model explained in the section 2 and its modified versions were all premised on this rule. In 
contrast, there seems no solid theoretical prediction about what the equilibrium of the cells 
without an antifraud rule is, while it is one of the hot topics in the researches of truth-
telling and reputation formation. Because at present it has not been analyzed and resolved 
completely, given positive probability of seller’s fraud reporting, how the buyer actually 
values the commodity after receiving the seller ’s report, and given the buyers’ beliefs and 
strategies grounded on their beliefs, how a seller in fact decides a message-sending strategy. 
That is the reason why I made this section’s title not ‘hypotheses’ but ‘behavioral forecasts’. 
 However, “in practice, antifraud rules are imperfect due to the cost and complexities of 
enforcement (King, 1996, Ibid., p.375).” So, although I realize the integrity of theoretical 
models whose critical bases of functioning are the existences of antifraud rules, the cells 
without an antifraud rule have been set up for this experiment. Thus, these cells are just 
exploratory cells and only designed to obtain some preliminary evidence. 
 The experimental researches, which was supposed that there was no antifraud rule and 
examined its influences are, for example, the cell B of King and Wallin (1990) which was 
the test of the basic model with no antifraud rule and the NC session in King (1996) which 
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investigated in the setting with no antifraud rule and no cost telling lies. The former was 
the setting that the number of possible values was three and the traded asset was a lottery 
ticket as denoted earlier and the latter was that experimenter paid for precisions in the 
prediction itself of subjects., so both settings are different from that of this experiment. 
 Regarding a taste of the behavioral predictions, they explained as follows. The buyer 
anticipates, in the single period game, a seller sends a false message about commodity’s 
value because the buyer is not able to impose a penalty on lying itself. Since the message is 
not informative, the buyers will ignore the seller’s message and value the commodity at the 
mean of the distribution m , i.e., 100 here, because of competition among buyers. Given 
that the buyers are expected to ignore the message, the seller’s best response is uncertain. 
But if there is positive probability which the buyer might believe a seller’s message, the 
seller might overstate the value nature selected45. In the finitely repeated game, this result 
is regarded as one of plausible ones using backward induction. For more detailed 
discussions about the seller ’s incentive to deviate from truthful reporting and the 
mechanism that caused to occur the equilibrium of seller’s truthful disclosure by positing 
some additional assumptions when there is no antifraud rule, see King and Wallin (1990) 
                            
45 On the contrary, in this situation, it may not be advantageous to a seller to under-state, that is, to send 
a message that the commodity value is below the value nature selected. Because it is not reasonable for 
the buyer to bid above 100 when the commodity value is revealed just 100, even if the buyer ignores the 
seller’s message. 
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and King (1996). 
 
5-2. Results and data analyses 
 In this section, I analyze the experimental data and report the results. In carrying out 
statistical tests, plural (more than one) observations from each experiment will be used. 
Therefore, there may be serial correlation, and conclusions should be deliberated with this 
in mind. Also, I must point out there are only a little data of 80 (= each cell had four market 
and each market had 20 periods)46. 
 In the analyses of cells with an antifraud rule, the data from the latter half mentioned 
frequently, as well as the data of all 20 periods. The reason why I will deal with such an 
additional data is that the subjects are assumed to establish their consistent message-
sending/bidding behavioral rules in the course of repeated trials. In this experiment, the 
question 3 and 7 of the post-experiment questionnaire asked all subjects acting as either 
sellers or buyers: ‘How many periods did you take to establish the way of reacting to 
opponents’ behaviors approximately?’ Their answers to the post-experiment questionnaire 
suggested that the almost all subjects had established their consistent approaches by the 
end of period 10. Thus, I write the data from the latter half in a separate with the intention 
of the analysis based on results that were arisen after all market participants fixed their 
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behavioral rules. Whereas the subjects acting as buyer decided how to react by five period 
at latest (some already had decided it at the 2nd period!), the subjects acting as sellers were 
clearly slow at deciding, although these results might not be surprising. 
 
Results from the cells with an antifraud rule (i.e., the cell ① and ②) 
Table 1: Proportions of disclosures
All 20 periodsThe latter half (Period 11～）
Cell ①（７)* 68.8%(＝55/80) 77.5%(＝31/40)
Cell ②（151）* 67.5%(＝54/80) 75.0%(＝30/40)
 * Parentheses represent the number of possible value. 
 Table 1 represents the proportions of disclosures in each cell (calculations are given in 
parentheses). On average, in the cell ① and ② sellers sended messages on 68.8 percent 
and 67.5 percent for all 20 periods, and the proportions of the cell ① and ② has increased 
to 77.5 percent and 75.0 percent for the latter half, respectively. However, these differences 
between all the periods and the latter half are not statistically significant ( 216.1=z , 
1.0>p  for the cell ① , and 026.1=z , 15.0>p  for the cell ② ). Using a test of 
proportions, even if the data from the latter half are employed, these proportion are 
significantly below 0.1  ( 41.3=z  for the cell ①  and 65.3=z  for the cell ② , both 
01.0<p ). Therefore, it would be impossible to conclude that full disclosures were occurred. 
However, it is here necessary to demonstrate the limitation on statistical test, which is 
derived from both the small samples of 40 and the fact that a single non-disclosure when 
                                                        
46 Experimental datas are available upon request from the author. 
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disclosure is theoretically predicted causes rejection of a 0 or 100 percent base-rate 
hypothesis47. 
 The basic model of disclosure does not always predict the occurrence of full disclosure. For 
sellers, the worst information (the lowest commodity’s value) is indifferent between to 
disclose and not to disclose. To argue the Hypothesis 1, I examined the proportions of 
disclosures both in each possible value of commodity (the cell ①) and in each range of the 
commodity’s values (the cell ②). The results are presented in Figure 1-1 (the cell ①) and 
Figure 1-2 (the cell ②). Also, in Figure 1-2 of the cell ②, as the number of possible values 
were 151, I divided them into 5 equal ranges arbitrarily. That is, the five range are, ‘the 
neutral news’ which is from 85 to 115 and includes the mean of distribution 100, ‘the good 
news’ and ‘the very good news’ which are beyond ‘the neutral news’ and from 115 to 145 and 
from 145 to 175, respectively and ‘the bad news’ and ‘the very bad news’ which are below 
‘the neutral news’ and is from 55 to 85 and from 25 to 55, respectively. Three values that 
just dropped on the border are not depicted in the Figure 1-2. These two figures seem to 
provide the obvious support for Hypothesis. Except for both the realizations of 25 when the 
number of possible value was 7 and the range [ ]55,...,25  (i.e., ‘the very bad news’) when it 
                            
47 For example, in order not to reject the null hypothesis that the proportion of disclosures is 100 percent 
at significant level of 05.0 , that is, to show that it is impossible to conclude that full disclosures are not 
occurred, more than 95 percent (i.e., 38/40) disclosure must be made (then 45.1=z , 07.0>p ). 
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was 151, in the latter half of the experimental sessions, disclosures were occurred in the 
proportions of 3231  (the cell ①) and 3430  (the cell ②48). In summary, although a 
seller was indifferent as to disclose of the realization of the lowest possible value, it can be 
concluded that he/she generally moved toward full disclosure. Other Bayesian Nash 
equilibriums as alternative hypotheses cannot explain the results here. 
 Now I will conduct some further analyses which focus on whether the subjects behaved in 
ways consistent with the basic model or not. 
 The theory assumes that, given no disclosure, buyers bid the mean of distribution at first 
and gradually revise them downward over time. When the subjects acting as sellers had 
sended no messages at the first time49, the averages of the buyers’ bids were 35.83 for the 
cell ① and 37.25 for the cell ②. These values are significantly different from the mean of 
                            
48 All four non-disclosures here were happened in the range of commodity’s value [ ]115,...,85 , which is 
named ‘the neutral news’. And 3 in 4 were due to a single subject acting as a seller in one market. She 
replied to the question 7 of the post-experiment questionnaire that she randomly made her disclosure 
decisions to intend the disturbance of market because she had been suffering the low payoffs from too 
much ‘solid’ bidding behaviors by the buyers. However such her strategy drove her to lower her payoffs less 
and less, and she replied to the next question 8, which was asked what the payoff-maximizing strategy had 
been she thought, that ‘to disclose all the commodity’s values or not to disclose anything’. There is an 
opinion that only experimental datas can tell its results. So I do not enter this issue further, but at last I 
denote as an interesting fact that these non-disclosure behaviors were strategic outcomes and she had 
reached both two extreme Bayesian Nash equilibrium introduced in the section 2. 
49 In all of eight markets with an antifraud rule, the case which sellers had sended no message occurred 
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distribution 100 ( 488.8=t  for the cell ① and 62.16=t  for cell ②, both 0001.0<p ). 
However, in the cell ②, the average bid is significantly different from 25 ( 25.3=t , 
005.0<p ), which is the lowest possible value. This result shows that the buyers could 
have appreciated that making on disclosure was synonymous with possession of bad news. 
 From the unraveling process referred in the section 2, it would be interesting to examine 
further as follows. For subjects acting as sellers, 
(a) Non-disclosures involving commodity’s value greater than the values he once had 
disclosed,  
(b) Disclosures involving commodity’s values less than the previous highest bid price given 
no disclosure,  
(c) Non-disclosures involving the commodity’s value greater than the previous highest bid 
price given no disclosure,  
and for those acting as buyers, 
(d) To bid above the previous lowest commodity’s value in the case of no disclosure, and 
more severely,  
(e) To bid above the average of 25 and the previous lowest commodity’s value given no 
message50. 
                                                        
by the 4th period at latest. 
50 Explaining (c), if a seller obtained the bid price of 60 when he/she had sended no message lately, he/she 
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 These behavioral patterns deviating from the unraveling process are exhibited in Table 2. 
The number of ‘total periods’ corresponds to the seller’s behavior in each market, and 
depends on the first non-disclosure, i.e., the number is 18 (= 20－2) if a seller didn’t disclose 
in the 2nd period.  
Table 2: Behaviors deviating from  the unravelling process
Cell ① Cell ②
Market 1Market 2Market 3Market 4Market 1Market 2Market 3Market 4
(a) 1 0 0 4 0 4 3 2
(b) 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 2
(c) 3 2 0 3 4 4 4 4
(d) 4 0 0 7 0 5 0 0
(e) 11 0 0 22 3 15 7 8
Total periods18 19 17 16 18 17 16 18 
 On equal terms with Chow et al. (1996), calculating the proportions of the number of 
deviating times to the possible largest unraveling processes, those are 20.86 percent 
( 13929= ) for the sellers and 15.83 percent (= ( )313966 ´ ) for the buyers. In view of the 
fact the subjects acting as buyers deviated these in the proportions of about 55 percent in 
Chow et al. (1996), it might to be said that somewhat contractive results are due to the 
existence of the buyers who were able to take their actions consistent with the theory. The 
subjects acting as buyers were able to make game-theoretic reasoning sufficiently, and the 
subjects acting as sellers unwillingly made voluntary disclosures of the commodities’ values 
in response to the buyers’ behaviors. 
 The results support Hypothesis 1. In the cells with an antifraud rule, the equilibrium 
                                                        
is thought to be unreasonable not to disclose the commodity’s value above 60, for example 100. He/she will 
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seemed to be one of full disclosure, although there are some methodological limitations as 
mentioned. In general, sellers disclosed all the realization of commodity’s value but those of 
the lowest one, and buyers were able to adjust such sellers’ behaviors. 
 Hypothesis 2 was motivated from the reviews of prior experimental researches to examine 
the relation between the number of possible commodity’s values and the experimental 
results. Table 1 shows that both for all 20 periods (from 68.8 percent to 67.5 percent) and 
for the latter half (from 77.5 percent to 75.0 percent), proportions of disclosures were not 
significantly different between the cell ①  and the cell ②  ( 029.02 =c and )069.0 . 
Therefore, Hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected. The number of possible states had, in the 
settings of this experiment, little influence on the results. It is unclear why such an 
inconsistent result between the prior researches and this paper happened. 
 
Results from the cells without an antifraud rule (the cell ③ and the cell ④) 
 As stated in the section 5-1, there is no solid theoretical prediction in the cells without an 
antifraud rule. Therefore, what happened in these cells is reported first, and next, I will 
attempt to compare them with the cells with an antifraud rule.  
 Figures 2 (Figure 2-1 and 2-2) represent ‘the commodity’s value vs. message’ in the cells 
without an antifraud rule. Figure 2-1 displays the result of the cell ③ and Figure 2-2 
                                                        
get nearly 100 (>60) if the commodity’s value is revealed. 
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displays that of the cell ④, graphically depicting what message the seller sended in 
response to the commodity’s value nature had selected. For the cell ③, the third dimension 
‘frequency ’ is set up additionally because each coordinate potentially has plural 
observations. For example, if a seller sended a message of 100 in one market period when 
the commodity’s value was 100 (i.e., he/she disclosed truthfully), this corresponds to 
coordinate (100, 100) and Figure 2-1 tells us there was one case like this. Given no 
antifraud rule, the seller was able to send a message of the value other than its real 
realization, he/she had sometimes informed the buyers of 75, 125, and so on when the 
realization was 100. For the cell ④, Figure 2-2 is easier to understand, and the diagonal 
line presents the cases which the commodities’ value were equal to the messages, that is, 
truthfully disclosures occurred, and the points upper left-hand of the diagonal line 
represent the cases where the commodities’ value were less the messages, i.e., 
overdisclosures occurred, and the points lower light-hand represent those where the 
commodities’ values were more than the messages, i.e., underdisclosures occurred.  
 Figures 2, in general, show the disclosure of value is either equal to or more than the 
realization, namely truthful disclosures or overdisclosures. Though underdisclosures might 
be disadvantageous to the sellers, King (1996) reports that sellers under-reported 11 
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percent of the time in his NC sessions, whereas there was few under-report51. Clearly, the 
experimental results are fairly consistent with the informal behavioral prediction that 
maintains overdisclosures occur generally given no antifraud rule. Also, this tendency 
towards overdisclosures seems to strengthen as the number of possible states increased. To 
compare with the cell ④  in which only one underdisclosure in 66 message sending 
opportunities occurred, 6 underdisclosures and 29 truthful disclosures in 62 opportunities 
occurred in the cell ③ . In the cells without an antifraud rule, two possible seller ’s 
behaviors were non-disclosure and ‘choosing one of possible commodity’s values’. Thus , in 
the cell ③, sellers were forced to announce one of possible values and were not allowed to 
send messages of the values other than possible commodity’s value (i.e., announcing 105 
when it is 100). There were therefore only 8 message-sending patterns including no 
disclosure in the cell ③. If underdisclosure is intuitively unreasonable, a seller’s option of 
sending message becomes smaller and smaller as the higher realization of commodity’s 
values is selected by nature. Because of this small set from which the seller was able to 
send messages, these results may be caused. 
 Given no antifraud rule, truthful disclosures of the commodities’ values are difficult to 
take place in general, and have a tendency toward less unfavorable as the prior uncertainty 
of commodity’s value increase. As regards this issue, I am interested in examined how the 
                            
51 In King (1996), the number of possible states was 101. 
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buyers responded to such sellers’ behavior. 
Ｔａｂｌｅ 3: Trading profit (= the commodity's value minu the purchasing price)
Av. s. 利益 損失 Av. s. 利益 損失
Cell ①Disclosure6.45 8.19 セル③ Disclosure18.9548.58
No Disclosure6.8437.8766 12 No Disclosure2.2255.96 51 28
Cell ②Disclosure8.78 9.13 セル④ Disclosure12.9233.23
No Disclosure24.5827.7771 4 No Disclosure1.5736.0556 23
(Note) Column 'Profit' and 'loss' represent its frequency.  's.' is the standard diviation. 
 Table 3 displays averages (column ‘Av.’) and standard deviation (column ‘s’) for the buyers’ 
trading profits and losses (using data from all periods), and shows how many times the 
buyers made trading profits (column ‘Profit’) or suffered the losses (column ‘Loss’) among 
all 80 trading periods in all 4 cells52. Regardless both of the cells and of the existence or 
inexistence of disclosures, the buyers made profits from trades in average (all Av.>0). 
However, the amounts and standard deviations have considerable differences among every 
cell. In the cells with an antifraud rule (the cells ① and ②), the buyers gained more profit 
in the case of non-disclosure. In contrast, the buyers gained much more profits when 
making disclosures in the cells without an antifraud rule (the cells ③ and ④). Comparing 
the cells with an antifraud rule to the cells without it, both the proportion suffering losses 
(31.9 percent = 51/160) and the standard deviations of trading profits in the cells without 
an antifraud rule are larger than those (10 percent = 16/160) in another cells. This may 
means that, an antifraud rule plays the critical role in both the avoidance of losses from the 
trade and the belittlement of variances in trading profits. Also, the larger the number of 
                            
52 The existence of some cases that the commodity’s value equaled bid price (i.e., trading profit/loss was 
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possible commodity’s value, the smaller the number and amount of trading losses. Taking 
these all into considerations, it may be concluded that the buyers might have conducted 
deliberately in order to avoid losses as the complexity of their conjectures at the moves had 
increased. 
 In order to investigate the influence of an antifraud rule further, it is significant to discuss 
the buyers’ responses to sellers’ message. Figure 3 (Figure 3-1 and 3-2) shows the price (i.e., 
the highest bid)53 versus messages and displays graphically the results of regressions of 
the price on message as the independent variable. Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2 represent the 
outcomes with and without an antifraud rule, respectively.  
 When with an antifraud rule, a slope of the regression was 9672.0 , an intercept was 
6192.3- , and this fitted model explained virtually all variances ( 955.02 =R ).  
 On the contrary, the result of the regression was widely different in the cells without an 
antifraud rule.  The explanatory power of the model without an antifraud rule was 
considerably less ( 4918.02 =R ). However one of the behavioral prediction here was that 
seller ’s message would be completely ignored. This was not the case. The slope was 4734.0  
and the intercept was 207.30 . That is, the buyers took the sellers’ message into 
                                                        
zero) prevents the total times from being 80. 
53 It can be thought as the measure which is able to infer the buyers’ responses other indexes such as all 
bids, average bid or median bid, and so on. However, I used the price as a substitute for those because of 
the practice of the first-price sealed-bid auction in this experiment.  
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consideration to some extent, and the tendency that a higher message generated a higher 
price is at least admitted. 
 
6. Summary and concluding remarks 
 While it is necessary to assume an antifraud rule as one of critical factors, the prediction 
of full disclosure seems to be correct as the basic model suggests. Sellers (i.e., managers in 
accounting context) were not indifferent between disclosures of the worst news and non-
disclosures of those, but they generally moved to disclose their private informations 
completely. Unlike prior researches, in the setting of this experiment, the number of 
possible states (i.e., commodity’s values or liquidating dividends) had little influence on the 
results. The causes for this divergence between the results from prior researches and the 
experimental result in this paper remain unresolved. The reason why the theoretical 
prediction was generally supported is mainly due to the existence of the buyers (i.e., 
investors), who were able to appreciate at earlier period that the commodity’s value 
(liquidating dividend) was lowest when a seller (a manager) made no disclosure. I can say, 
such buyers urged sellers to make full disclosures.  
 In the cells without an antifraud rule, overdisclosures, that are the case where a seller (a 
manager) informs the commodity’s value (liquidating dividend) beyond its realization, 
occurred in general. Furthermore, such tendency become outstanding as the number of 
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possible states increased. On the contrary, underdisclosures were of rare occurrence 
(particularly in the cell ④), and this is fairly different from King (1996), which reports that 
sellers under-reported 11 percent of the time in his NC sessions. 
 While buyers (investors) valued the commodity (liquidating dividend) and bid based on 
only seller’s (manager’s) disclosure in the cells with an antifraud rule, the buyers 
(investors) discounted fairly the value disclosed by the sellers (managers) in the cells 
without it, though it was not as perfect as predicted. Though the buyers (investors), in 
average, did not suffer trading losses, but there were obviously more periods of losses in the 
cells without an antifraud rule than in the cells with it. 
 These are main results in this paper. The attempt to find some linkage between these 
experimental results and the naturally occurring markets can be severely limited at 
present. The reason is that the model tested in this experiment was too simple and a lot of 
factors in which will be necessary to apply to the real world were omitted and not virtually 
considered54. Also, as pointed out repeatedly in the chapter 1 of Kagel and Roth (1995), not 
one single experiment but a series of experiments can only explain something more about 
the real world. But, it is true that the results of this experiment suggest some possibility of 
further sophisticated experiments on this realm that are motivated from the brand-new 
modified models grounded on the real world. From now on, it is necessary to grasp the 
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situation of real world (particularly, Japan), to comprehend the theoretical models entirely 
and to increase their tractability as much as possible, in order to understand managers’ 
incentives to voluntary disclosure more precisely.  
 Like all of the other experimental researches, this experiment also continually have to be 
questioned about, (1) whether I had given some bias to the subjects and led to some 
arbitrary result or not throughout all the phases of experiment, and (2) whether the design 
was suitable for the experimental test of the basic model or not. Also, conducts of 
experiment taught me how difficult to bring out the subjects’ incentives to involve hardly 
(by responses to the post-experiment questionnaires and postures in the laboratory). The 
design that the cash payment depends more directly on the quality of subject’s decision 
making55, and producing the experimental task with more challenge seem to be strongly 
requested. These all may suggest some modifications on the design of this experiment. 
                                                        
54 For further discussions of this issue, see King (1991, p.194). 
55 On a parallel with the trade of lottery ticket in King (1991), if the setting is changed that the 
experiment task of an investor is making some investment decision to one project, nature selects its 
probability of success, and a manager is informed and decides to disclose this probability or not, this 
problem may be mitigated in some degree. However such a setting needs to be set up a new experimental 
session, in which asks subjects their attitudes towards risk directly (that is, for example, ‘How much do 
you invest a project which brings you in one return of ¥1,000 with probability 50 percent?’). Allowing 
subjects transact plural commodities in each period may submit one of the solutions for this problem, such 
as in Forsythe et al. (1989). 
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Figure 3-1. Cells with an antifraud rule (Cell ① and ②)
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Figure 3-2. Cells without an antifraud rule (Cell ③ and ④)
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